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Introduction 
 
The stabilization of European agricultural markets, which was one of the initial objectives of the 
Common  Agricultural  Policy  (CAP),  is  today  questioned.  Indeed,  successive  reforms  have 
progressively replaced the price support scheme initially set up by the CAP, by a system of 
payments  more  and  more  decoupled  from  production  and  prices.  While  still  supporting 
agricultural  incomes,  this  evolution tends  to reconnect  European  to  international agricultural 
markets, and so to expose European agricultural producers to market fluctuations they did not 
face in the past.  
Regarding this increase of European farmers’ exposure to market risks, more and more attention 
is being paid today to private risk managing instruments. Some of these instruments, including 
storage, already  existed  in the  past but  were  not  extensively  used  by  agricultural  producers, 
notably because of the existence of a public price support. Thought, private storage behaviors, 
which derive from inter temporal arbitrages, tend to reduce price volatility and can therefore 
stabilize markets (Makki et al., 1996).  
One can presume that, with the removal of the public price support, private storage will be more 
and more used on European markets and will mitigate the increase of market volatility induced 
by this removal. There is however some limits to the use of private storage as a risk managing 
instrument.  Anderson  (1992)  notably  shows  that  the  markets’  stabilization  induced  by 
stockholding behaviors is very sensitive to storage costs: a small decrease of storage costs can 
generate a huge decrease of price volatility. This raises the question of the opportunity of a 
public intervention on storage. More and more attention is besides being paid to the opportunity 
of such an intervention at the world level (see the recent propositions of von Braun and Torero 
(2009), for instance). One way for governments to intervene on storage is to directly buy or sell 
stocks, so as to contain market prices, within a band determined by a support price and a release 
price for instance. This kind of mechanism was besides formerly used by the European Union 
(EU) to keep agricultural prices above an intervention level and stabilize markets. Nevertheless, 
public stockholdings have proven to be very costly (Jha and Srinivasan, 1999). Furthermore this 
mechanism generates a decrease of price volatility, which is a necessary condition for private 
storage to hold, and thus discourage private stockholdings (Glauber, et al., 1989, Zant, 1997). In 
the  United  States  (US), for  instance,  the  removal,  in  1996,  of  the  public  storage scheme  in 
agricultural sectors led to an increase of the private storage activity and thus induced almost no 
changes in the volatility of agricultural prices (Lence and Hayes, 2002). Finally, buffer stock 
mechanisms can have an impact on production decisions, turn out to be distortive and do not 
comply  with  the  World  Trade  Organization  (WTO)  rules.  Another  way  for  governments  to 
intervene on private storage is to stimulate private storage by providing a financial support to 
stockholders.  
In their study comparing different market stabilization programs, Glauber et al. (1989) conclude 
that subsidizing private storage is the most cost effective way to stabilize market prices because 
storage subsidies can easily adjust to stochastic phenomena. Choi and Meyers (1989) however 
question these results, arguing notably that they do not account for the (positive) impacts of 
storage subsidies on production decisions in their model. Furthermore, the issue of the impact of 
such  subsidies  on  speculative  behaviors  should  be  considered.  Indeed,  it  has  often  been 
mentioned that the behaviors of non rational speculators could destabilized markets (Ravallion, 
1987, for instance). Femenia (2010), using a dynamic Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) 
framework,  shows  that  even  if  they  are  not  fully  rational  speculative  behaviors  stabilize   2 
agricultural markets, and thus contradicts this assumption. One can however wonder about the 
new behaviors a storage subsidy could induce. Taking account of all agents’ behaviors, as a can 
CGE model do, to study the effect of storage subsidies thus seem important. Furthermore, as 
shown  by  Jha  and  Srinivasan  (1999),  greater  price  stability  achieved  through  a  government 
intervention does not necessarily imply greater welfare for economic agents; indeed, in that case 
too much price stability eliminates private storage and generates very high government costs, 
which  decreases  social  welfare.  Here  again  CGE  models  thus  seem  the  most  appropriate  to 
simulate global welfare effects. Yet, whereas CGE frameworks are widely used to study the 
effects of agricultural policies, none of the aforementioned works dealing with private storage 
subsidies has been conducted using a CGE model. One of the main reasons for that is probably 
that, as pointed out by Wright and Williams (1988), studying the effects of market stabilization 
mechanisms requires a dynamic framework and, in the case of storage subsidies, the modeling of 
stockholding behaviors. However few CGE models display such characteristics. Among them is 
the inter temporal dynamic CGE model developed by Femenia and Gohin (2009a) and Femenia 
(2010) which includes stockholding behaviors and can incorporate imperfect expectations.  
Our main objective in this paper is to simulate the impacts on markets fluctuations following 
CAP reforms of a subsidization of storage costs aimed at stimulating private storage at the world 
level,  and  to  study  the  welfare  effects  of  this  public  intervention.  To  do  so,  we  use  the 
aforementioned dynamic CGE model. We also rely on the work of Femenia and Gohin (2009b) 
to adequately represent the CAP in the model. We simulate the effects of a radical reform: the 
complete removal of the CAP in arable crops sectors and study the impacts on the volatility of 
agricultural markets of a storage cost subsidy set up in the Rest of the World (RoW).   
We find, as expected, that the CAP removal in arable crop sectors destabilizes European markets 
and tends to stabilize markets in the United States (US) and in the RoW. Our simulations also 
confirm  the  smoothing  effect  of  private  storage  on  market  fluctuations.  However,  the 
subsidization of private storage, even if it boosts the world stock levels, has a destabilizing effect 
on agricultural markets. In fact, this subsidy, by lowering the occurrence of stock shortages, and 
their  associated  moderated  price  spikes,  deprive  economic  agents,  in  particular  farmers,  of 
market  information.  Once  these  subsidies  are  set  up,  agents  are  thus  less  prepared  to  stock 
shortages that still (but less frequently) arise, which eventually leads to very large price spikes, 
and so to larger market volatilities. These subsidies do thus not prove to be efficient in terms of 
market stabilization. Neither do they prove to have positive effects in terms of welfare. In fact, 
because the demand for private stocks increase following the subsidies set up, good quantities 
available for consumption decrease; this induces welfare losses at the world level.  
In the next section we briefly recall the main features the dynamic CGE model. Then, we present 
the data used with a particular focus on the way the “standard” data have been modified to 
improve the modeling of the CAP instruments in arable crop sectors, we also present the policy 
scenarios that are simulated. The last section is devoted to the presentation of our main results. 
Finally we conclude.   
 
1. The model 
To  be  able  to  study  the  effects  of  different  storage  subsidies  on  market  volatility,  while 
accounting for both the linkages between agents’ inter temporal decisions and for the potential 
role of imperfect expectations, we use a dynamic CGE model developed by Femenia and Gohin 
(2009a) and Femenia (2010). This model is based on a version of the GTAP framework (Hertel,   3 
1997) adapted to the study of agricultural markets. The main distinctive features of this dynamic 
model are as follows.   
 
1.1 Dynamics 
As usual in dynamic CGE model, the accumulation of capital stocks is used as link between 
periods: sectoral capital stocks accrue from one period to another in each region: 
( ) 1 1 irt irt ir irt K I K d + = + - , with K  the capital stock,  I  the new investment and d  the depreciation 
rate of capital, the subsets i,  r  and  t denoting respectively the sector, the region and the time 
period concerned. 
In addition to this usual linkage between periods, Femenia and Gohin (2009a) give an inter 
temporal  dynamic  dimension  to  their  model  by  introducing  the  inter  temporal  dimension  of 
producers’ investment and households’ savings decisions.  
To take their investment decisions producers maximize the present value of their firm (Devarajan 
and Go, 1998), which corresponds to the discounted value of their expected future profits (capital 
income) minus their expected future investment costs. Solving this optimization problem leads to 
a condition (Equation 1) determining the optimal investment in each sector and each region:  
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With  wk  the unitary capital income, PI  the price of investment,  r the endogenous interest rate 
and j  a parameter representing the adjustment cost of capital. 
Then because, as we will detail later, producers have limited knowledge about output price, 
capital returns and interest rate in the far future, they are assumed to consider that the economy 
will reach a steady state at some future period. This “producer steady state” may never arise, 
because they periodically revise their plans, but this formulation allows to determine the optimal 
firms’ investment plan at each period, and so their current investment.  
Households also base their saving decisions on inter temporal arbitrages. Indeed they spend a 
part of the income they earn at one period to consume goods, which brings them some utility, 
and save the remaining part. The part of the income saved at one period will be used later to 
consume  and  thus  represents  a  future  utility.  So,  households  maximize  their  inter  temporal 
utility,  subject  to  an  inter  temporal  budget  constraint.  The  first  order  condition  of  this 
optimization program (Equation 2) determines the evolution of savings: 
( ) 1 1
1
1
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                                (2) 
With  E  the  total  income  ((including  interest  earned  from  foreign  assets,  factor  returns, 
distributed profits and tax receipts),  S  savings and  r  a time preference parameter (households 
have a preference for immediate utility). 
As producers, households have limited knowledge about prices and incomes in the far future; 
they are thus also assumed to consider that the economy will reach a steady state at some future 
period. Once  again,  the steady state expected  by  households  may  never  be  reached  but  this 
condition, combined with Equation (2), determines households’ savings plan, and thus current 
savings at each period.  
These different characteristics of agents’ inter temporal decisions, combined with a foreign debt 
accumulation period by period, are the main features of our model allowing the simulation of the 
dynamic evolution of markets.   4 
1.2 Sources of market volatility 
Two sources of price volatility on agricultural markets are identified in the economic literature 
(Butault and Le Mouël, 2004). On the one hand, many economists have argued that fluctuations 
on  agricultural  markets  were  essentially  due  to  demand  and  supply  shocks  (Moschini  and 
Hennessy, 2001): the time lag between production decisions of farmers and harvests induces a 
short-term rigidity of the agricultural supply, which can hardly adjust to market price changes. 
Furthermore most agricultural products are staples and demand for these goods is quite inelastic. 
Because of these two characteristics agricultural markets are very sensitive to market shocks: a 
supply decrease due to a, exogenous shock will result in a large price increase. Yet agricultural 
production is exposed to several epidemic and climatic risks and these exogenous shocks occur 
quite  frequently,  thus  generating  price  fluctuations.  On  the  other  hand,  the  inter  temporal 
dimension of decision processes implies that agents have to form expectations about the future 
path of economy at the time they take their decisions. Many studies dealing with uncertainty 
assume rational expectations (Williams and Wright, 1991, for instance). However, processing 
and collecting information can be costly and it can in fact be more rational for economic agents 
to form imperfect expectations (Just and Rausser, 2002) and thus make expectation errors. As 
formalized by Ezekiel (1938) in his Cobweb theorem, these expectation errors can spread over 
time and induce endogenous fluctuations of market prices. Fluctuations on agricultural markets 
can therefore be first induced by exogenous stochastic shocks and then endogenously amplified 
and  spread  over  time  by  the  imperfect  nature  of  economic  agents’  expectations.  These  two 
aspects are introduced in the model as follows. 
Firstly, exogenous supply shocks  e  are introduced through the productivity parameter of the 
CES production function,  ir q . We assume that  ( ) 0, N e e s ∼  which implies that the “shocked” 
productivity parameter fluctuates around its mean value  ir q , calibrated from the data, with a 
variance equal to 
2 2
ir e q s .  
Secondly, assuming that farmers have the right information concerning their own productivity 
(that they know the distribution of the exogenous shocks affecting their production) seems quite 
obvious. On the other hand, their expectations about market prices are assumed to be imperfect, 
which introduces an endogenous source of volatility in the model. For that purpose we follow 
Femenia and Gohin (2009a) and rely on Nerlove’s work (1958) who proposed a formalization of 
adaptive expectations based on past information. These expectations are such that agents take 
their past expectation errors into account to form their new expectations:  
( ) ( ) 1 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ 1 irt irt irt irt irt irt P P P P P P a a a + = + - = + -                           (3) 
ˆ P denotes the expected price and  P  the observed market price, a  can be seen as a measure of 
the adjustment speed of expectations. 
 
1.3 Modeling of storage 
Stockholding  behaviors  are  introduced  in  the  model  as  in  Femenia  (2010).  Namely,  one 
representative stockholder in each region holds stocks and can sell a part of these stocks or buy 
other stocks at current market price at each period.  
The stockholder maximizes his inter temporal profit which corresponds to the discounted sum of 
his sales minus his purchases and the storage costs. Solving this optimization program leads to 
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With  irt ST  the quantity of good i stored in region  r  at period  t,  rt k  the unitary storage cost in 
the  region.  This  equation  is  the  standard  relationship  explaining  stockholding  behaviors 
(Williams and Wright, 1991): if the cost of buying goods at time $t$ and storing them during one 
period  is  lower  than  the  (discounted)  price  at  which  these  goods  can  be  sold  at  time  t+1, 
stockholders buy goods thus increasing the current prices until an equality holds in the first 
condition of Equation (4). On the contrary, if the cost of buying goods at time t and storing them 
during  one  period  is  higher  than  the  price  at  which  these  goods  can  be  sold  at  time  t+1, 
stockholders  sell  their  stocks  thus  lowering  current  market  prices  until  the  same  equality  is 
reached or until their stocks are null (an equality holds in the second condition of Equation (4)), 
in which case the market is in equilibrium even if an inequality holds. These considerations 
explain  why  stockholding  behaviors  come  to  mitigate  market  price  volatility,  and  also  why 
sudden price peaks can occur in case of null stocks.  
Furthermore,  storing  a  commodity  generates  costs  paid  by  stockholders  and  made  up,  for 
instance, of the rent of grain silos and of the wages of workers who carry out stock handling. In 
order to determine these factor incomes, a storage service sector is represented in the model. This 
sector uses labor and capital factors which are combined through a CES function to produce the 
“storage service good”. Then, as for the other goods, the zero profit condition in this sector 
allows  to  endogenously  determine  the price  of the  storage  service which  corresponds  to the 
unitary storage cost, thus endogenous in the model. Moreover, as capital stocks are subject to 
adjustment costs, the storage capacity does not adjust instantaneously to stockholders’ demand 
which places an upper limit on this capacity even if no storage bound is explicitly imposed. 
Finally,  the  market  equilibrium  conditions  determining  market  prices  includes  beginning-of-
period stocks on the supply side and end-of-period stocks on the demand side. Stocks buying and 
sales thus have an impact on equilibrium market prices. 
 
1.4 Execution of the model 
The model is solved iteratively, period by period, because agents readjust their decisions at each 
period, and in two steps for each period. This sequencing of the model resolution deserves some 
explanation. 
As  we  already  mentioned, consumers  and  producers  base  their  decisions  on  expected future 
market prices. Furthermore, contrary to other agents, farmers do not observe market prices at 
time they take their production decisions. To take this specific feature of agricultural sectors into 
account the model is solved in two steps: in a first step agricultural production decisions are 
taken, based notably on farmers’ expectations about market prices. At this time the prices of 
factors  used  for  agricultural  production  adjust  to  ensure  the  equilibrium  between  farmers’ 
demand and factor owners’ supply. In a second step, agricultural quantities produced are sold, 
consumption, savings, investment and stockholdings decisions are taken, and prices of goods and 
factors allocated to non agricultural activities adjust so as to ensure the market equilibrium.  
If a productivity shock occurs after agricultural producers have decided how much to produce, 
then the quantities effectively produced are not equal to what farmers had expect. On the other 
hand, the other economic agents observe the market conditions and thus know current market 
prices at time they take their decisions. In the first step, determining agricultural production 
decisions,  the  model  is  thus  solved  by  considering  expected  productivity  values  ( ir q )  and   6 
exogenous price expectations of producers (instead of endogenous market prices). The outcome 
of this first step corresponds to what agricultural producers plan and thus determines the level of 
production  factors  they  use.  The  real  agricultural  supply  can  then  be  computed  using  the 
production function and the “real”, shocked, productivity values. In the second step, the model is 
solved by considering the levels of agricultural factors and agricultural supply as exogenous. The 
outcome  of  the  model  corresponds  to  what  effectively  happens  on  markets,  and  notably 
determines the market prices, the levels of investment and the stock buying or selling. In the next 
period, the first step is re-executed by taking into account the new levels of stockholdings and 
capital  stocks,  resulting  from  the  previous  period  decisions,  and  the  new  expectations  of 
agricultural producers. The second step is re-executed by taking into account the new producers’ 
plans and the new agricultural supply levels. And so on.  
 
2. Data and simulations 
As already mentioned, the model we use is based on the GTAP AGR framework.  We have 
already  detailed  the  modifications  bring  to  the  GTAP  AGR  model  to  introduce  dynamic 
behaviors and to account for private storage. Yet, some other differences with the GTAP AGR 
framework deserve some explanations. These concern the GTAP database, the calibration of 
parameters and the modeling of CAP instruments. Before turning to the simulation results, we 
therefore describe these particular features of our framework. We also devote the last part of this 
second section to the definition of simulations. 
 
2.1 Data 
To  run  our  simulations,  we  use  the  6th  version  of  the  GTAP  database  calibrated  on  2001 
economic flows  and  including  tariffs,  export  subsidies  and  direct payments  for  the  different 
region represented. These data are aggregated to 12 sectors, among which 7 are agricultural 
sectors, and 3 regions: the European Union (EU), the United States (US) and the Rest of the 
World (RoW).  
As the GTAP database was initially aimed at being used in a static framework to simulate long 
term effects, we need to make some assumptions to calibrate the data for our dynamic model. 
Here  again  we  follow  Femenia  (2010)  and  assume  that  the  initial  interest  rate  r,  the  time 
preference parameter  r  and the unit capital installation cost j are all equal to 5%. This, along 
with the assumption that the economy is initially in a steady state, allows the calibration of all 
dynamic parameters. Furthermore, we reduce by half the supply price elasticities in agricultural 
sectors to account for the fact that agricultural supply adjusts more hardly in the short term than 
in the long term. Finally, the expectation adjustment parameter a is set to 1/5. 
Finally, we introduce wheat stockholdings in the three regions.  
 
2.2 Modeling of the CAP instruments 
Our main objective is to simulate the effects of a storage subsidy on the market volatility induced 
by the removal of CAP instruments in arable crops sectors. To do so, we need first to simulate 
this volatility as accurately as possible. Yet, as shown by Femenia and Gohin (2009b), in the 
standard GTAP AGR framework the modeling of CAP instruments, notably in the arable crops 
sectors, suffers from some drawbacks. We thus follow these authors and bring some change to 
the GTAP database and the modeling of the CAP instruments. Namely, we transfer the EU intra-
trade flows from foreign exchanges to EU domestic consumption; we assume that the arable crop 
direct payments are partly land subsidies, partly labor subsidies and partly capital subsidies, and   7 
not only land subsidies as in the initial model; we take into account the set-aside policy linked to 
these direct payments; finally, and most importantly, we take into account the effects of the EU 
variable  export  subsidies  and  import  tariffs  on  price  volatility  by  introducing  them  as 
endogenous variables which adjust so as to keep unchanged imported quantities (for variable 
tariffs) and domestic prices (for variable export subsidies) in the wheat and other coarse grains 
sectors. 
 
2.3 Definition of simulations 
The simulations are conducted over 30 periods.  
We first simulate a benchmark scenario in which there are no political changes. In that case 
markets volatility results from productivity shocks occurring each year in the wheat, oilseeds and 
other cereals sectors in all regions. These exogenous shocks can lead agricultural producers to 
make mistakes when they anticipate forthcoming prices, thus also generating an endogenous 
volatility  of  markets.  For  each  region  and  each  sector,  the  30  stochastic  exogenous  shocks 
affecting agricultural productivity are generated according to normal distributions  ( ) 0,0.01 N  in 
the EU and the US, and  ( ) 0,0.02 N  in the RoW to reflect the highest yield variability, due to 
climatic hazards for instance, in this large region. Furthermore, to make sure that the results we 
obtain are not essentially due to some specificity of the generated samples, we run some Monte 
Carlo experiments and repeat the simulations using 50 different samples.  
In a second time, we use the same 50 shock samples and simulate the effects of a removal of the 
CAP instruments in the wheat, oilseeds and other cereals sectors. Namely, we remove the import 
tariffs, export subsidies and direct payments, and increase by 5% the land endowment in these 
sectors to reflect the removal of the set-aside policy linked to the direct payments. This policy 
reform is implemented  gradually from the 3rd  to the 6th periods. Comparing the results we 
obtain  in  this  second  step  with  those  of  the  benchmark  scenario,  we  will  thus  be  able  to 
characterize the changes in arable crops markets volatility induced by the CAP reform.   
Finally, in a third time, we simulate the effects of the same CAP reform along with a private 
storage subsidy which is set up at the end of the CAP reform (at the 6th period). This subsidy is 
introduced in the RoW via a subsidization of 80% of the stoarage costs
1, which will lead to a 
price decrease in the storage service sector, and thus to a decrease of the storage costs. 
 
3. Results 
Before turning to the simulation results, we must make it clear that, for some of the 50 samples, 
one or more of the simulated scenarios lead to diverging dynamic systems. This is not very 
surprising. Indeed, even if many feedback effects represented in our CGE model decrease the 
occurrence of diverging cobwebs (see Femenia and Gohin, 2009a) they do not totally eliminate 
them. We have thus chosen to remove the “diverging” samples, which reduces to 28 the total 
number of samples used in our analysis. 
 
3.1 Benchmark scenario 
Table 1 below reports the standard deviations of output, price and farm income in the EU, the US 
and RoW simulated with our model in the benchmark case, that is to say when no changes in 
agricultural policies are implemented. The figures reported in the table are the mean values of the 
28 standard deviations simulated with the different productivity shocks samples. As our main 
                                                 
1 Different rates of subsidy have been tested and the conclusion of the study remain the same.   8 
concern is to study the expediency of subsidizing private storage, we focus on the effects of 
private storage and thus report the results corresponding to a situation without private storage 
(left part of Table 1) and those obtained when private storage is introduced in the model (right 
part of  Table 1}.    
[insert Table 1] 
In this benchmark scenario, the market volatility is only due exogenous shocks arising in all 
regions and to the expectation errors made by agents when they take their decisions.  
It appears that even if the volatility of exogenous disturbance is quite limited, with standard 
deviations equal to 0.01 in the EU and the US and to 0.02 in the RoW, the volatility of output 
can be twice higher. This is so because of the endogenous aspect of fluctuations in our model. 
Indeed, at each period the stochastic disturbances lead agricultural supply and market prices to 
be different from what agricultural producers had expected, which conduct them to re adjust their 
price expectations and so their production decisions at the next period. This endogenous source 
of output volatility thus comes in addition to, and is also sustained by, the exogenous shocks.  
The standard deviations of prices are even higher in the RoW and the US, between 0.13 and 0.06 
without storage depending on the sectors.  This is notably due to the inelasticity of the demand 
for agricultural products and the rigidity of their supply in the short run which makes prices very 
sensitive to supply changes (as formalized by the King’s law). The price volatilities of wheat and 
other cereals are however much lower in the EU than in the other regions (0.03 instead of 0.10 
for wheat and 0.00 instead of 0.09 or 0.06 for other cereals). These figures illustrate the price 
stabilizing role of the European price support scheme and, in particular, of the variable export 
subsidies and tariffs. On the contrary, in the oilseeds sector, which is much less protected, the 
standard deviations of prices are equal to 0.13 for all regions.  
Then, in addition to the volatility of output and price, we have reported the standard deviations of 
farm incomes in Table 1. Indeed, even if most of the studies dealing with agricultural market 
risks focus on output and price fluctuations, what matters to farmers is the stability of their 
incomes. Yet, if prices and outputs are negatively correlated, price fluctuations can compensate 
output fluctuations and thus, in a sense, provide a form of income insurance for agricultural 
producers. With standard deviations of income ranging from 0.04 to 0.27, this is obviously not 
the case here.  
Finally, when stockholding behaviors are introduced in the model, the price and farm income 
volatilities in the wheat sector are lower in all regions. This observation comes to confirm the 
results of Femenia (2010) who shows that, even if economic agents have imperfect expectations, 
private stockholding behaviors allow a stabilization of markets.  
 
3.2 CAP removal 
Having  described  the  main  characteristics  of  the  volatility  on  agricultural  markets  in  the 
benchmark case, we now get interested in the effects of a complete CAP removal in the wheat, 
oilseeds and other cereals sectors on this volatility. However, before turning to this central issue 
in our paper, we describe the long term effects of this radical policy reform. 
The mean effects of the CAP reform observed over the last 5 simulation periods are considered 
as long term effects, they are reported in Table 2.  
[insert Table 2] 
The effects on output, price and farm income of the removal of CAP instruments in arable crops 
sectors are in accordance with those commonly found in the economic literature. Indeed, without 
storage, the suppression of tariffs, export subsidies and, above all, direct payments in the EU   9 
induces a decrease of production in the wheat (by 18.7%) and other cereals (by 13.4%) EU 
sectors. The production drop is smaller (-7.6%) in the European oilseeds sector because direct 
payments are initially smaller in this sector and there are no tariffs nor export subsidies. This 
production decrease induces a prices increase by 9.9% for wheat, 6.6% for oilseeds and 13.6% 
for other cereals. Overall, the price increases do not compensate the production decreases and 
EU farm incomes are negatively impacted by the reform: they decrease by 64.6.5% in the wheat 
sector, by 36.1% in the oilseeds sector and by 58.3% in the other cereals sector. In the US and 
the RoW the production increases in the 3 sectors to compensate the decrease of EU exports (due 
to the removal of export subsidies and to the decrease of production), and to satisfy the increase 
of EU imports (due to the tariffs removal). Then, because of the world prices increase induced by 
the increase of imports and the decrease of exports from the EU, prices slightly rise in these 
regions  (between  0.3%  and  1.4%).  The  production  and  price  increases  lead  to  farm  income 
increases in the US and the RoW.   
[insert Table 3] 
Table 3 reports the welfare effects of the reform in the three regions. The welfare effect in the 
EU is highly positive (around 25 US$ billions over the 30 periods), essentially because of the 
additional disposal income induced by of the CAP removal. In the RoW, which is the main 
trading partner of the EU and thus the main beneficiary of the European export subsidies, the 
increase of agricultural prices induces a welfare loss which amounts to 6 US$ billions. In the US 
the additional value added in agricultural sectors comes to mitigate the price increases and allows 
the welfare effects in the US to be positive, even if rather small (0.4 US$ billion over the 30 
periods). Globally, the welfare impact is positive at the world level. 
[insert Table 4] 
As  shown  in  Table  4,  the  effects  of  the  CAP  removal  on  price  fluctuations  in  the  EU  are 
unambiguously positive: the mean standard deviation of the EU prices increase from 0.03 to 0.10 
for  wheat,  from  0.13  to  0.14  for  oilseeds  and  from  0.00  to  0.07  for  other  cereals,  in  the 
simulations  without  stockholdings,  the  magnitude  of  the  effects being  almost  the same  with 
stockholdings. This is not surprising, since the public instruments protecting European markets 
from world price fluctuations have been removed. The increase of price volatility is besides 
much more important in the wheat and other cereals sectors than in the oilseeds sector which was 
less  supported  before  the  reform.  Furthermore,  output  fluctuations  also  increase  in  the  EU 
following  the  reform.  This  can  be  explained  by  the  endogenous  dimension  of  the  volatility 
represented in our model: the destabilization of prices induces a destabilization of agricultural 
producers’ price expectation, and so a destabilization of their production. The EU farm incomes 
are thus also destabilize in the wheat and other cereal sectors, but not in the oilseeds sector where 
the standard deviation of income decreases from 0.27 to 0.19. In fact, the liberalization of EU 
markets tends to “reconnect” the oilseeds sector to the initially highly protected wheat and other 
cereal ones. The market fluctuations in the three sectors are thus more related after the reform 
than before which benefits to the oilseeds one. The same kind of mechanism explains why price 
volatility of wheat and other cereals are reduced in the RoW and the US after the CAP removal. 
The transfer of risk from protected markets to world markets has often been used as an argument 
in favor of a liberalization of agricultural markets (see Tyers and Anderson, 1992, for instance). 
Here we must acknowledge that the reductions of price volatility are however very limited, and 
that  almost  no  reduction  of  output,  neither  farm  income,  fluctuations  are  observed.  This  is 
probably,  once  again,  due  to  the  endogenous  source  of  market  volatility  represented  in  our 
model: following the reform expectation errors of European agents spread to foreign markets and   10 
come to increase the endogenous fluctuations on these markets. This last phenomenon partly 
compensates the decrease in volatility induced by the CAP removal. 
Focusing now on the effects of private wheat storage on our simulation results, we can first 
notice that the production effects of the CAP removal are slightly reduced in all sectors. The EU 
wheat production now decrease by 16.1%, compared to 18.7% when no private stocks are held 
before and after the reform; and the RoW and US wheat productions respectively increase by 
1.4%  and  2.0%  compared  to  2.0%  and  2.4%  without  storage.  This  can  be  explained  by 
considering the price volatilities after the reform, reported in Table 4. Indeed, as we have seen, 
whether private wheat storage is introduced or not, the CAP removal induces an increase of the 
standard deviations of EU prices in the wheat, oilseeds and other cereals sectors. Yet, the more 
prices  fluctuate  the  more  the  private  storage  activity  is  stimulated.  So,  when  stockholding 
behaviors are represented in the model, wheat stockholdings in the EU increase after the reform. 
In fact, as reported in Table 5, wheat stocks are nil before the reform, whereas the mean wheat 
quantities held by stockholders at each period reach 0.8 millions of tonnes after the reform. This 
new  stockholders’  demand  for  wheat  thus  comes  to  mitigate  the  wheat  production  decrease 
induces by the CAP reform. The opposite phenomenon arises in the RoW and in the US: the 
CAP removal induces a decrease of price fluctuations, which slows down the wheat storage 
activity in these regions (from 16.2 to 14.4 millions of tonnes of wheat stored at each period in 
the RoW and from 0.8 to 0.5 millions of tonnes in the US). The decreases of stockholders’ 
demand for wheat have a negative effect on wheat productions which thus increase less when 
private storage is introduced in the model. The introduction of private wheat storage in the model 
also reduce, but to a lesser extent, the effects of the reform on the oilseeds and other cereal 
productions. The three sectors are indeed closely related, as inputs for the animal production for 
instance.  
The differences between the effects of the reform on price and farm income levels, simulated 
with and without storage, are for their part very small. The only slightly significant effects of 
storage seem here to be a larger increase in the EU wheat price (10.1% instead of 9.9%) and a 
lower  increase  of the  RoW  farm  income  (3.2%  instead of  3.4%) following  the  reform.  The 
(relative)  decrease  of  the  RoW  wheat  farm  income  is  easily  understandable,  since  the 
introduction of storage has a negative effect on the production of wheat and the effect on wheat 
price is unchanged in this region. The relative wheat price increase in the EU is however more 
questioning. Indeed, private storage is usually found to have a decreasing effect on prices (see 
Williams and Wright, 1991 or Femenia, 2010, for instance). The increasing effect which seems 
to appear here is in fact due to the nature of the figures reported in Table 2: these are percentage 
changes compared to a benchmark cases. However the price levels simulated in the benchmark 
(not  reported  here)  are  already  different  with  and  without  storage:  they  are  lower  when 
stockholding behaviors are taken into account. So, what seems to be a price increase due to the 
introduction of storage in the model is in fact the expression of the same price levels arising in 
the EU wheat sector after the CAP reform, whether storage is accounted for or not.   
[insert Table 5] 
Finally, stockholding behaviors have a positive impact on world welfare gains, which are 115 
US$ million higher with storage than without (see Table 3). These positive effects benefit to the 
RoW (93 US$ million) and the US (44 US$ million). On the contrary the EU welfare gains are 
reduced when private storage is taken into account (-24 US$ million). An increase of private 
storage (as in the EU) thus seems to lower welfare gains, whereas a decrease of private storage 
(as in the RoW and the US) seems to increase them. This can be explained by the reduction of   11 
wheat quantities available for consumption and the increase of wheat price caused by an increase 
of stockholders’ demand for wheat; and the increase of quantities available for consumption 
caused by a decrease of stockholders’ demand. However, as risk neutrality is assumed in our 
model, these welfare effects do not acknowledge for the positive effect market stabilization could 
have on welfare if agents were risk averse.  
 
3.3 Private storage subsidies 
We have seen in the previous section that private storage has a positive effect in terms of global 
welfare  and  tends  to  limit  the  market  fluctuations  induced  by  the  CAP  removal.  One  can 
therefore  presume  that  stimulating  private  stockholdings  behaviors  at  the  world  level  by 
subsidizing private storage could be beneficial. This is what we evaluate now.  
We simulate the impacts of a 80% subsidization of production costs in the RoW storage service 
sector implemented at the end of the CAP reform. This induces a decrease of wheat storage costs 
at the world level and stimulates private storage: the mean quantities of wheat stocks held by 
period are now equal to 0.8 millions of tonnes in the EU, 24.9 millions of tonnes in the RoW, 
and 1.1 millions of tonnes in the US, that is a 67% mean increase world stocks. 
The long term effects of this new reform are reported in Table 6 below. We can notice, on the 
one hand, that the introduction of the storage subsidy has almost no effect on productions. On the 
other hand, the price increases are now higher than with the CAP removal alone, especially in the 
wheat sector: the price increases following the reform are now equal to 10.3% in the EU, 1.0% in 
the RoW and 1.7%, compared to 10.1%, 0.7% and 1.4% without the storage subsidy. Contrary to 
the previous (seeming) price increase observed in the EU wheat sector after the introduction of 
storage in the model (see section 3.2), these results cannot be explained by the nature of the 
figures reported here. Indeed, the benchmark cases compared to which these percentage changes 
are  computed  are the  same  for  the CAP  reform  alone  and  the  CAP  reform  and  the  storage 
subsidy. These results are thus surprising, since one would better expect a negative effect of the 
increase of stockholdings on wheat price levels. 
[insert Table 6] 
Another surprising result lies in the volatilities observed in the wheat sectors. Indeed, the main 
argument in favor of a subsidization of private storage is that stockholding behaviors allow to 
stabilize agricultural markets. This is besides what we observed in the benchmark and the CAP 
removal scenario. Yet, as reported in Table 7, the standard deviations of wheat productions, 
prices and farm incomes are higher here than before the introduction of the storage subsidy. In 
the RoW, for instance, the standard deviation of output is now equal to 0.04, compared to 0.03 
without the subsidy, the standard deviation of price is equal to 0.09, compared to 0.08, and the 
standard deviation of farm income is equal to 0.13, compared to 0.12. These differences are 
certainly small, but are in sharp contrast to what was expected from the subsidy. 
[insert Table 7] 
In fact, a closer look at the results we obtain for a particular representative sample allows to 
understand the mechanisms at work here, and to explain both why the fluctuations on wheat 
market increase, and why the wheat prices increase, once the storage subsidy is introduced. We 
have reported the evolution, for that sample, of wheat prices following the CAP reform without 
(Figure 1} and with (Figure 3) the subsidization of private storage in the RoW. Figure 2 reports 
the evolution of wheat stocks in the world with and without storage subsidy.   
[insert Figure 1, 2, 3]   12 
What appears first, on Figure 1, is that, at the beginning of the simulations prices are identical 
with  and  without  storage  subsidy.  However,  from  period  10,  they start  evolving  differently: 
sudden price peaks are rarer but higher with the storage subsidy. As illustrated by Figure 2, these 
peaks  correspond  to  stock  shortages  in  both  scenarios.  These  well  known  effects  of  stock 
shortages on prices are, in a sense, responsible for the increase in market volatility following the 
subsidization of private storage. Indeed, when storage is subsidized quantities of wheat stored by 
private stockholders are higher (see Figure 2), which can prevent some price increases, as in 
period 10 for instance: with the subsidy, world wheat stocks are sufficiently high to prevent the 
price  increase  due  to  a  stock  shortage  that  arises  without  the  subsidy.  However,  the  stock 
shortage effectively arises in the next period and its consequences on wheat prices are more 
important. The difference is that, with the subsidy, wheat producers, who have not observed the 
sudden price increase in period 10, expect a relatively low price for period 11, they thus plan to 
produce a relatively low quantity of wheat; as a negative productivity shock arise the quantities 
effectively produced are even lower, and since quantities of wheat stored are not, this time, high 
enough to satisfy the demand, stocks are completely cleared and wheat prices highly increase. 
On the other hand, without the subsidy, wheat producers who observed a price increase in period 
10, plan a higher price for period 11 and thus produce more wheat which prevents wheat market 
prices to reach too high values. To sum up, when the storage subsidy is in place, wheat stocks, by 
preventing frequent price rises, eliminate these market signals and thus decrease the amount of 
information used by producers to take their decisions, which eventually gives rise to higher price 
increases. As a matter of fact, since, even if rarer, sudden price increases are higher with the 
storage subsidy, the standard deviations of prices are also are higher, and so are mean wheat 
price levels.  
[insert Table 8] 
Finally, Table 8 reports the welfare effects of the CAP reform with private storage subsidies. The 
welfare gains in the EU and the US are lower, and the welfare loss in the RoW is higher than 
when the CAP reform  was implemented alone. As a consequence, the overall welfare  gains 
decrease from 19691 US$ millions to 18707 US$ millions, which represents almost a 1 billion 
US$ loss. This is in fact not very surprising regarding first the huge increase in world wheat 
stocks which tends to decrease the quantities of goods available for consumption, and second the 
increase of mean prices of wheat following this reform.  
The effects of the storage subsidy simulated here are thus globally negative, in terms of welfare 
first, but also in terms of market stabilization as this subsidy tends to destabilize markets. The 
only (slightly) positive effect of the subsidization of private storage we find here is a relative 
increase of farm incomes in the wheat sector.  
 
Conclusion 
Our main objective in this article was to study the effects of a subsidization of private storage on 
the volatility of agricultural markets following the removal of CAP instruments in arable crop 
sectors.  Indeed,  in  the  current  context  of  agricultural  market  liberalization,  more  and  more 
attention is being paid to the need for a public intervention to stabilize these markets. Such an 
intervention could take the form of storage cost subsidies aimed at stimulating private storage at 
the world level. We have thus used a dynamic CGE model, taking into account the inter temporal 
dimension of economic agents’ decisions, to study the impacts of a subsidy of wheat storage 
costs implemented in the RoW, both in terms of market stabilization and welfare effects. This 
model assumes that agents have imperfect expectations, which allows a representation of the   13 
endogenous source of market volatility. The exogenous source of volatility is also represented 
through the introduction of productivity shocks.  
Our first results, concerning the effect of the removal of CAP instruments in the wheat, oilseeds 
and other cereals sectors, illustrate the effects of this reform on agricultural market fluctuations. 
Indeed, following the reform, the output, price and farm income volatilities increase in the EU, 
especially in the wheat and other cereals sectors where prices were highly supported (by variable 
tariffs and export subsidies) before the reform. On the contrary, the fluctuations on arable crop 
markets tend  to decrease  in  the  other  regions  (the US  and the  RoW).  This  comes  from the 
suppression of the transfer of risk from EU to world markets initially induced by the EU price 
support mechanism. However this decrease of volatility observed on foreign markets is rather 
limited compared to the increase observed in the EU. As these simulations have been conducted 
with and without introducing wheat storage in the model, our results also reveal the stabilizing 
effect of stockholding behaviors on agricultural markets. We also show that an increase of the 
storage activity (as induced by the higher price volatility in the EU after the CAP reform) tends 
to have negative effects on welfare. This can be explained by the negative effect of stockholders’ 
demand on quantities of goods available for consumption. Turning then to the effects of the 
storage cost subsidy, we find that, whereas this subsidy effectively increase the quantities of 
stocks held at the world level, they do not have the anticipated effects on market fluctuations. 
Indeed, this subsidy, by increasing stocks, lowers the occurrence of stock shortages, and their 
associated price spikes. But this deprives economic agents, in particular farmers, of the market 
information provided by these (moderated) spikes. Once these subsidies are set up, agents are 
thus less prepared to stock shortages that still (even if less frequently) arise. This eventually leads 
to very large price spikes, and so to larger market volatilities than without the subsidy. These 
subsidies do thus not prove to be efficient in terms of market stabilization. Furthermore, as they 
increase storage, they also generate welfare losses at the world level.  
From the results of this study, it thus appears that, whereas private storage allows a stabilization 
of agricultural markets, stimulating private stockholders’ activity by subsidizing storage costs 
can  in  fact  destabilize  markets.  According  to  these  results,  private  storage  subsidies  should 
therefore not be considered as an instrument to stabilize agricultural markets after CAP reforms. 
We are however quite reluctant to draw too general policy conclusions from this study. Indeed, 
the potential risk aversions of economic agents have not been introduced in the model, yet this 
could change the outcomes of the model. Furthermore, the subsidy we have chosen to represent 
here is rather basic: it simply consists in a fix subsidy to production costs in the storage service 
sector.  More  elaborated  ways  to  stimulate  private  storage  at  the  world  level,  like  subsidies 
adjusting market conditions, should certainly be considered before concluding that there are no 
incentives to publicly intervene in storage at the world level 
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Tables  
 
    Without Storage  With Storage 
    EU  RoW  US  EU  RoW  US 
Output  Wheat  0.02  0.03  0.02  0.02  0.03  0.02 
  Oilseeds  0.02  0.03  0.02  0.02  0.03  0.02 
  Other Cereals  0.01  0.03  0.01  0.01  0.03  0.01 
Price  Wheat  0.03  0.10  0.10  0.02  0.09  0.09 
  Oilseeds  0.13  0.13  0.13  0.13  0.13  0.13 
  Other Cereals  0.00  0.09  0.06  0.00  0.09  0.06 
Farm Income  Wheat  0.10  0.15  0.07  0.09  0.12  0.06 
  Oilseeds  0.27  0.15  0.19  0.27  0.15  0.19 
  Other Cereals  0.04  0.12  0.06  0.04  0.12  0.06 
Table 1. Standard Deviations in the Benchmark 
 
    Without Storage  With Storage 
    EU  RoW  US  EU  RoW  US 
Output  Wheat  -18.7  2.0  2.4  -16.1  1.4  2.0 
  Oilseeds  -7.6  0.6  0.5  -6.4  0.3  0.6 
  Other Cereals  -13.4  0.8  0.7  -11.8  0.8  0.5 
Price  Wheat  9.9  0.7  1.4  10.1  0.7  1.4 
  Oilseeds  6.6  0.3  0.5  6.6  0.3  0.5 
  Other Cereals  13.6  0.4  0.5  13.6  0.3  0.5 
Farm Income  Wheat  -64.6  3.4  6.9  -64.7  3.2  6.8 
  Oilseeds  -36.1  1.0  1.4  -36.1  1.0  1.4 
  Other Cereals  -58.3  1.4  2.2  -58.3  1.4  2.2 
Table 2. term effects of the CAP reform (%age changes compared to the benchmark) 
 
Without Storage  With storage 
EU  RoW  US  Total  EU  RoW  US  Total 
25255  -6097  419  19576  25231  -6004  463  19691 
Table 3. Welfare effects of the CAP reform (Equivalent variation in income, 2001 US$ million) 
 
    Without Storage  With Storage 
    EU  RoW  US  EU  RoW  US 
Output  Wheat  0.06  0.03  0.02  0.06  0.03  0.02 
  Oilseeds  0.04  0.03  0.02  0.04  0.03  0.02 
  Other Cereals  0.04  0.03  0.01  0.04  0.03  0.01 
Price  Wheat  0.10  0.10  0.10  0.09  0.08  0.08 
  Oilseeds  0.14  0.13  0.13  0.14  0.13  0.13 
  Other Cereals  0.07  0.09  0.05  0.07  0.09  0.05 
Farm Income  Wheat  0.19  0.K14  0.07  0.18  0.12  0.07 
  Oilseeds  0.19  0.16  0.19  0.19  0.16  0.19 
  Other Cereals  0.16  0.11  0.06  0.16  0.11  0.06 
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  EU  RoW  US 
Benchmark  0.0  16.2  0.8 
CAP reform  0.08  14.4  0.5 
Table 5. Mean quantities of wheat stocks held by period (in millions of tonnes) 
 
    EU  RoW  US 
Output  Wheat  -16.1  1.5  2.1 
  Oilseeds  -6.4  0.3  0.6 
  Other Cereals  -11.8  0.8  0.5 
Price  Wheat  10.3  1.0  1.7 
  Oilseeds  6.7  0.4  0.6 
  Other Cereals  13.7  0.4  0.5 
Farm Income  Wheat  -64.6  4.0  7.4 
  Oilseeds  -36.1  1.1  1.5 
  Other Cereals  -58.3  1.5  2.3 
Table 6. Long term effects of the CAP reform with private storage subsidies in the RoW(%age 
changes compared to the benchmark) 
 
    EU  RoW  US 
Output  Wheat  0.06  0.04  0.02 
  Oilseeds  0.04  0.03  0.02 
  Other Cereals  0.04  0.03  0.01 
Price  Wheat  0.09  0.09  0.09 
  Oilseeds  0.14  0.13  0.13 
  Other Cereals  0.07  0.09  0.05 
Farm Income  Wheat  0.19  0.13  0.07 
  Oilseeds  0.19  0.16  0.19 
  Other Cereals  0.16  0.11  0.06 
Table 7. Standard Deviations after the CAP reform and the set up of private storage 
 
EU  RoW  US  Total 
24959  -6708  455  18707 
Table 8. Welfare effects of the CAP reform with private storage subsidies in the RoW (Equivalent 
variation in income, 2001 US$ million) 
 
   17 
Figures 
 
Figure 1. Evolution of wheat prices following the CAP reform, without storage subsidization 
(percentage change compared to the baseline) 
 
 
Figure 2. Evolution of wheat stocks in the world following the CAP reform, with or without storage 
subsidization (percentage change compared to the baseline) 
 
 
Figure 3. Evolution of wheat prices following the CAP reform, with storage subsidization 
(percentage change compared to the baseline) 